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California Lower Income Housing Policy:
At Legislative and Judicial Crossroads
Introduction
Local land use regulations in California have long resulted in
closing suburban housing and land markets to low and moderate in-
come families. Local officials too frequently have employed exclu-
sionary land use techniques to promote local interests at the expense
of regional housing needs. Land use regulations originally intended
to maintain community health and safety standards have been used
to bar low and moderate income housing. For example, by estab-
lishing zoning restraints on multifamily dwellings, setting minimum
lot sizes for single family homes, precluding mobile homes, and re-
quiring subdividers to provide expensive public improvements,' local
governments have diminished the supply of land available for low
income housing.2 Such land use practices cause the price of homes
to increase.3 The cumulative effect of these regulations, therefore,
acts to exclude potential residents whose housing budgets are exceeded
in part because of higher prices attributable to the regulations.
This denial of residential access in the suburbs has many poten-
tial adverse consequences. The exclusionary ordinances of several
cities may operate in combination to reduce severely the supply of
low and moderate income housing in a region. 4  Lower income per-
sons are crowded into the existing lower cost housing, typically lo-
cated in the central city. The resultant overcrowding often leads to
rent increases or causes the housing to deteriorate structurally at a
1. E.g., utility systems, streets, schools, and parks.
2. B. J. Frieden, Housing in America: 1976 at 15 (Dec. 1976) (unpublished
working paper No. 274, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of
California, Berkeley).
3. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. R!v. 767, 781 (1969). See also Ellickson, Suburban Growth
Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L. J. 385, 391, 500 (1977)
(proposing a lump-sum damage award as consumers' class-action remedy for exclu-
sionary land use regulations). Although studies show that interest rates and finance
charges are responsible for recent sharp increases in housing costs, it is not disputed
that restrictive land use regulations traditionally have accounted for and continue to
account for, high housing prices in the suburbs.
4. The extent and bounds of a region are variable. A region is generally con-
sidered to be the geographical area in which housing units are in competition for the
people seeking housing.
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level far above normal rates. 5 Exclusionary land use regulations also
force the low or moderate income individual to forego job oppor-
tunities in the suburbs to the extent the employment involves an
unreasonable commute from the center city." Most low income job
seekers in poor central city areas rely on public transportation, but
almost all existing public transportation networks are poorly struc-
tured to move people from central city residential areas to suburban
job centers during rush hours.7 This predicament forces most work-
ers employed in suburban areas to use automobiles for commuting;
yet many poor central city workers cannot afford automobiles. 8
Another adverse effect of exclusionary land use restrictions is the
fostering of cultural segregation by promoting residential segregation
along socioeconomic lines. 9 The continued exclusion of almost all
lower income households from developing suburban areas fosters un-
desirable divisiveness. Different economic groups will continue to
attend and patronize separate schools, churches, shopping centers,
and community activities. This occurrence leads to the development
of spatially separate and unequal societies. 10
This Note examines the effect of the California legislature's de-
velopment of a low and moderate housing policy and evaluates the
validity of exclusionary land use regulations in an area of regional"
lower income housing shortages. The first part of the Note surveys
California statutes, administrative regulations, and current legislative
proposals regarding lower income housing. Recent legislative action
has apparently put legislative programs in disorder so that responsi-
bility for providing Californians of all economic segments with equi-
table residential access has been placed on the courts.
The second part of the Note discusses the prospects of judicial
invalidation of exclusionary land use regulations. The California
Supreme Court's decision in Associated Homebuilders of the Greater
Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 2 which requires regional welfare
considerations in local zoning, is reviewed. The Note then advocates
5. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
6. This development is especially troubling because job opportunities are grow-
ing fastest in the suburbs. See C. Haar & D. Iatridis, Housing the Poor: Exclusion and
the Courts, in 1 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 493
(1975).
7. A. DowNs, OPENING Up =H SUBURBS 28 (1973).
8. Id.
9. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 218-21, 336 A.2d 713, 748-49 (1975) (Pashman, J., concurring).
10. A. DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS, pp. 42-45 (1973).
11. See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
12. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
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rigorous application of Livermore so that low and moderate income
households are not denied equal access to affordable housing.
Low and Moderate Income Housing Policy
Before the Legislature
The Housing Element Requirement
The California legislature's most important statement concerning
low and moderate income housing is found in California's planning
and zoning law enacted in 1969.' s This law requires that all local
governments adopt general plans which include nine mandatory ele-
ments. One of the mandatory elements is a housing element, which
must consist of standards and plans both for improvement of housing
and for adequate housing sites. Significantly, the housing element
must describe the process by which a locality is making "adequate
provision for the housing needs of all economic segments of the com-
munity."
14
The California legislature's intent regarding low and moderate
income housing policy is evidenced not only by its 1969 enactments
but also by the Housing and Home Finance Act of 1975 (Housing
Act).'r In the Housing Act, the legislature determined that the
early attainment of a decent home and a satisfying environment for
every Californian is an important goal for state government.' 6 In
support of this goal, the legislature created the State Department of
Housing and Community Development as a permanent state agency
and directed it to prepare a statewide housing plan for legislative
approval.' 7 The plan is considered vital to the Housing Act's pur-
pose because it will help to establish a unitary system of planning
and delivery for federal and state housing and community develop-
ment aid. The legislature directed that the plan be designed to take
account of housing conditions for all economic segments and provide
for the identification of any market restraints that prevent a substan-
tial reduction in the number of households that pay more than 25
percent of their gross income for shelter. The statewide plan has
been promulgated and is currently before the legislature for review
and adoption.' 8
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1977).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. CAL. Ht& AL. & SAFETY CODE §§ 41000-42080 (West Supp. 1977).
16. Id. at § 41002.
17. Id. at §§ 41100, 41125 (West Supp. 1977). The former department existed
under a temporary legislative mandate, due to expire in 1976.
18. Letter from Myron Moskovitz, chairman, Commission of Housing and Com-
munity Development, to the California legislature (May 16, 1977).
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Notwithstanding the state level endorsement evident in the plan-
ning and zoning law and the Housing Act, local governments in Cali-
fornia have been slow in adopting and implementing adequate hous-
ing elements. A survey of local compliance with the planning legis-
lation indicates deep-rooted municipal resistance to the program. By
early 1973, only 38 percent of the cities and 67 percent of the counties
had adopted a housing element, which has been required since 1969.
By late 1974, 66 percent of the cities and 76 percent of the counties
had complied.19 This increase signals an improvement but could
be misleading; notwithstanding the enactment of a housing element,
the plan may not be adequate.20  What constitutes compliance with
the housing element requirement has been debated. At a minimum,
the housing element should describe how local land use regulations
are permitting the construction of multifamily dwelling units, the
siting of mobile homes, the decrease of lot sizes for single family
homes, and the reduction of expensive public improvements exacted
from subdividers. The housing element does not require municipal-
ities to build housing. That function is performed by private build-
ers or various kinds of associations; for public housing, it is performed
by special agencies created for that purpose at various levels of gov-
ernment. The municipal function under Government Code section
65302(c), instead, is to provide the opportunity for homebuilders
to construet lower income housing. Eliminating land use regulations
that unduly generate costs in the development of land fosters this
objective.21 If a locality cannot provide the opportunity for low
income housing construction, existing administrative regulations pro-
vide that the political and economic obstacles impeding the objectives
of its lower income housing plans must be set forth in detail.2 2  Most
existing housing elements do not meet these requirements. The typ-
ical plan includes no more than the locality's population, average in-
come level, and land availability.23
Local government's sluggish and inadequate response to the gen-
eral plan's mandate emanates from two widely held concerns. First,
municipal governments premise their resistance on a home rule argu-
ment. They contend that local officials are best able to determine
19. PLANNING AND CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA TODAY 82 (1975).
20. Id. at 82-83.
21. This conclusion is implicit when the language of section 65302(c), requiring
adequate provision of housing for all economic segments, is combined with the proposed
administration guidelines interpreting the section. See text accompanying notes 27-32
supra.
22. 25 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 6320 (1977).
23. Telephone interview with Cleve Livingston, staff attorney for the State De-
partment of Housing and Community Development (Aug. 25, 1977).
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local housing needs and that any state intervention will only add
another layer of bureaucracy that will hamper the smooth functioning
of local government. Second, municipal officials argue that their
budgets are stretched to their fiscal limits. This predicament, they
say, prevents them from increasing the size of their overburdened
planning staffs and from engaging in comprehensive planning as de-
manded by statute.24
The failure of municipalities to promulgate adequate housing
elements is also partially the result of the state governments failure,
until recently, to provide guidance. The brevity of the housing ele-
ment statute and the lack of meaningful regulations on implementa-
tion have caused confusion for local governments about the specificity
for the components of the housing element required for compliance
with the legislative mandate.25  In April 1977, the State Department
of Housing and Community Development adopted emergency revised
Housing Element guidelines to end the confusion while permanent
revised Guidelines were being promulgated.26
Department of Housing and Community Development Regulations
The State Department of Housing and Community Development
(HCD) revision of the Housing Element Guidelines (Guidelines)
began in May 1976Y.2 The original guidelines, adopted by the
Reagan-appointed Commission on Housing and Community Devel-
opment, were so terse that they were ineffective in making specific
the general statutory language of Government Code section 65302(c),
the housing element provision. 28  The old guidelines were not adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and, therefore, were
not binding on local cities and counties. 29  HCD, energized by the
24. Testimony of William Kaiser, lobbyist for the California League of Cities,
Hearings on A.B. 389 and S.B. 1058 before the Assembly Committee on Housing con-
cerning proposed amendments to the housing element requirement of general plans.
25. Knight, California Planning Law: Requirements for Low and Moderate In-
come Housing, 2 PSEPPERDn L. REv. S159, 5162 (1974).
26. 25 CAL. Arnm. CODE §§ 6300-50 (1977). See CAL. Gov"T CODE §§ 11421,
11422.1 (West Supp. 1977) regarding the validity and procedure for adoption of
emergency regulations.
27. Letter of Arnold Sternberg, Director, State Dep't. of Housing and Community
Development, accompanying revised Housing Element Guidelines (April 29, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Sternberg letter].
28. Knight, California Planning Law: Requirements for Low and Moderate In-
come Housing, 2 PEPPE=DIE L. REv. S159, S163 (1974).
29. For administrative promulgations to have binding effect, they must be de-
veloped in accordance with certain hearing and notice requirements set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act. See CAL. GovT CODE §§ 11371, 11373-74, 11420, 11423-
25 (West 1966).
Brown administration and its new status as a permanent state agency,
thus assumed the responsibility for implementation of the legislative
goal of attaining a decent home and satisfying environment for every
Californian. As a step toward this goal, HCD completed permanent
revisions to the Guidelines after engaging in public hearings and con-
sultation with representatives of local and regional governing bodies
and the State Office of Planning and Research.30  The proposed reg-
ulations are comprehensive and, as interpretive regulations, establish
the criteria against which local compliance with the housing element
requirement is to be measured. 31 Generally, the revised guidelines
require that a housing element contain a thorough problem solving
strategy. The element must establish local housing goals, policies,
and priorities aimed at alleviating unsatisfied housing needs. Addi-
tionally, it must set forth the course of action that the locality is
undertaking and intends to undertake to effectuate these goals, pol-
icies, and priorities.
HCD has encountered opposition to its new regulations from lo-
cal officials. First, they argue that the department lacks the statu-
tory authority to promulgate binding guidelines. This argument is
based on an interpretation of Government Code section 65040.232
Section 65040.2 describes as responsibilities of the Office of Planning
and Research (OPR) the preparation and adoption of general plan
guidelines. Although the statute does provide for the adoption of
advisory guidelines, the guidelines to which this section refers are
those adopted and developed by OPR pursuant to section 65040.2.
Section 65040.2, however, does not apply to the housing element
guidelines. The statute expressly denotes that OPR is responsible
for the preparation of guidelines for all mandatory elements of the
general plan except the housing element.
The contention that the Housing Element guidelines are manda-
tory and have binding effect is supported by the reading of other
statutes. The specific code provision for a housing element, Govern-
ment Code section 65302(c), expressly requires that local housing
elements be developed pursuant to regulations. The Housing and
Home Finance Act directs HCD to adopt such regulations. 33  It
states that such regulations are to be adopted in accordance with the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).31 This requirement is im-
30. The regulations have not been formally adopted, pending determination of
HCD responsibilities under the California Environmental Quality Act. Sternberg let-
ter, supra note 27.
31. Proposed revised Housing Element Guidelines (to be codified in 25 CAL. ADM.
CODE as § 6206) (currently on file with Secretary of State).
32. CAL. GOV'T ConE § 65040.2 (West Supp. 1977).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41134 (West Supp. 1977).
34. Id. In pertinent part, The Housing Act reads, "The department shall adopt
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portant because, in the opinion of the California Attorney General,
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the APA are obligatory and
thus have the force of law. Careful scrutiny of the statutes, there-
fore, reveals that the legislature intended that the housing element
guidelines have the effect of binding regulations and were not in-
tended to be advisory.
HCD's position that the proposed guidelines have binding effect
is additionally supported by analgous case law concerning implemen-
tation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) . 5 The
Public Resources Code directs that the State Office of Planning and
Research develop, and the State Resources Agency adopt, in accord-
ance with guidelines for the execution of CEQA.3a Both OPR and
the Resources Agency have read this language to require the adoption
of binding regulations. 37  The judiciary has given full legal force to
these guidelines. 83
The second ground on which HCD has encountered local resist-
ance to its revised regulations is on the theory that the regulations
impose implementation costs on local government that require state
reimbursement under section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code
(S.B. 90).39 S.B. 90 requires state reimbursement of all state man-
dated local costs. 40  S.B. 90 did not become effective until 1973 and,
accordingly, as HCD is quick to point out, does not apply to local
costs incurred in complying with a pre-1973 legislative mandate.41
Local governments have been required to have an adequate housing
element as a component of their general plan since 1969,42 and the
instant revision of the guidelines does not enlarge this pre-S.B. 90
mandate. Local recalcitrance based on S.B. 90 should not excuse
noncompliance with the 1969 statute.
To date, only one court has construed the housing element pro-
vision of California's planning and zoning law.43 A recent "citizens
guidelines for the preparation of housing elements required by Section 65302 of the
Government Code. The guidelines ... shall be adopted in accordance with the pro-
visions of Chapter 4.5... of Part I of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code
[the Administrative Procedure Act]" 55 Op. A-r'y GErN. 381, 383 (1972).
35. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West Supp. 1977).
36. Id. at § 21083.
37. 14 CAL. 'ADM. CODE § 15005. (as promulgated by OPR & the Resources
Agency).
38. E.g., Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712,
723-24, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96, 102-03 (1974).
39. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 2231 (West Supp. 1977).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1977).
43. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974). The
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suit," Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine,44 sug-
gests how concrete case law interpreting Section 65302(c) might de-
velop. The suit which pre-dated the Livermore decision also is an
example of how proponents of low income housing might expand the
rule of Associated Homebuilders v. City of Livermore.45  Liver-
more requires regional housing needs to be weighed against local in-
terests when local land use regulations exclude low and moderate
income households.
46
The Irvine Suit and Legislative Retreat
Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine was trig-
gered by the defendant City Council's adoption on December 10,
1974 of a planned community zoning ordinance for the proposed
Irvine Industrial Complex-East.47  The complex is a 2,000 acre in-
dustrial park that will generate a need for at least 54,000 dwelling
units. Of these units, 45,000 will be required to house low and mod-
erate income families drawn by newly created employment to the
Irvine region. The city plan, however, made no provision for this
housing need, even admitting that local prices effectively exclude
such persons.
48
This litigation was kindled by prior acts and omissions. Prior
to the city's December 1974 action, a need for 3,000 units of low and
moderate income housing already existed. 49  Families with incomes
of less than $14,000 could not afford to live in the city.5" Yet, seven-
ty-five percent of those persons employed in the already established
Irvine Industrial Complex-West had incomes of less than $14,000.51
The University of California campus, located within the city, had
approximately 8,000 students, some number of whom needed low
income housing in the city.52 Some 750 of the 3,770 marines as-
signed to El Toro Marine Base, located adjacent to the city, would
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District of California also did consider the case
concerning housing elements, Leonard v. City of El Cerrito, 1 Civ. No. 34762 (filed Mar.
26, 1974), but the opinion was decertified for publication by the Supreme Court at
the request of the State Attorney General's Office.
44. Civ. No. 225824 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 5, 1975).
45. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
46. See text accompanying notes 69-86 supra.
47. Brief for Plaintiff, Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine, Civ.
No. 225824 at 8-12 (Orange County Super. Ct. filed Mar. 5, 1975).
48. GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CITY OF IRVINE, ch. 4 at 9.
49. Brief for Plaintiff at 6, Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine,
Civ. No. 225824 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 5, 1975).
50. GENERAL PLAN FOR THE CITY OF IRVINE, ch. 4 at 9.
51. Id., ch. 4 at 7, Figure 5.6.
52. Id., ch. 4 at 7.
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have lived off base in the city or in neighboring cities if there had
been housing available that they could have afforded.5
Prior to December 1974, there were a number of actions that
had been taken by the Irvine City Council that, when analyzed cumu-
latively, demonstrated the city's disregard for the dearth of lower in-
come housing in its community. On February 19, 1974, for example,
the City Council had rejected a site plan for 280 units of rental apart-
ments in an area zoned for apartments since 1964. On September
3, 1974, the City Council had received a housing implementation
report from its planning department in which there was a finding
that 75 percent of the employees in the Irvine Industrial Complex-
West earned less than the minimum required to purchase housing
in Irvine. Yet, the council rejected planning department recom-
mendations that it join the Orange County Housing Authority, which
assists localities in obtaining federal subsidies for low income housing
projects; that it enact a real estate transfer tax to fund low income
housing programs; and that it appoint a city housing commission
charged with studying Irvine's lower income housing shortage. On
a broader scale, the City Council, on October 22, 1974, defeated a
proposal that 60 percent of residential units in a core area housing
development be set aside to serve persons of low and moderate in-
come ranges, and instead set aside only 20 percent of the units for
those needs.54 Although Irvine apparently had had a major housing
problem for a number of years, legal steps were not taken to oppose
the city's pattern of exclusionary zoning until citizens realized that
the ICC-East project would greatly exacerbate Irvine's lower income
housing shortage.
Plaintiff Orange County Fair Housing Council stated two causes
of action in its complaint against the Irvine City Council. In its
first cause of action, Fair Housing alleged that the city's general plan
did not satisfy Government Code section 65302(c), nor did it com-
ply with HCD guidelines because it did not provide an adequate
number of housing sites for all economic segments of the community.
The second cause of action alleged that the Irvine Industrial Complex-
East rezoning was unlawful because the rezoning was not consistent
with the general plan.55 In isupport of its complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that the city had not taken any action to accommodate the
45,000 new workers who would not be able to afford housing in Irvine
and that such inaction was contrary to the Irvine general plan's
53. Id. at 8.
54. Brief for Plaintiff at 12-13, Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of
Irvine, Civ. No. 225824 (Orange County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 5, 1975).
55. See CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 65860 (West Supp. 1977) (requiring land use regu-
lations to be consistent with local general plans).
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official statement that all persons who work in Irvine should have
access to adequate housing at affordable prices.
The HCD guidelines seemed to be the crux of Fair Housing's
first cause of action. The guidelines are a standard against which a
locality's general plan can be measured for conformance to the hous-
ing element requirement. 56 The HCD guidelines upon which plain-
tiff specifically relied in its complaint, however, were those regula-
tions promulgated by the original HCD Commission. These guide-
lines were never adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act and were not considered binding.
57
The city of Irvine reacted to the litigation by having legislators
introduce a panoply of bills intended to weaken low and moderate
income housing policy.58 Of the bills59 presented to the legislature,
S.B. 1058 (Carpenter), A.B. 389 (Ellis), and A.B. 1727 (Robinson)
have received the most attention. S.B. 1058 would amend the hous-
ing element requirement to provide that it is not the legislature's
intent that cities and counties subsidize the housing needs of any
or all economic segments of the community. 60 S.B. 1058, if then in
effect, probably would have vitiated the suit against Irvine because
the housing element law would have become vague and ambiguous.6'
A.B. 389, if passed, would also alter previously expressed legislative
intent. The bill provides that HCD guidelines shall be only ad-
visory to local governments.
62
A.B. 1727, a proposed amendment to section 65302(c) provides
that the housing element of a general plan must make adequate pro-
vision for the housing needs of all elements of the community "only
56. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
57. See CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§ 11373-74 (West 1966). HCD's recent promulga-
tion of emergency revised guidelines in accordance with the APA, however, could have
considerably strengthened Fair Housing's position. Assuming that the guidelines are
binding, plaintiff could have relied on them to demonstrate that Irvine's housing ele-
ment was inadequate.
58. Telephone interview with Fred Silva, consultant to the Committee on Local
Government of the California State Senate, Aug. 15, 1977.
59. The measures are A.B. 389, A.B. 1667, A.B. 1668, A.B. 1711, A.B. 1713,
A.B. 1727, A.B. 1750, S.B. 1007, S.B. 1008, S.B. 1039, S.B. 1058, S.B. 1076 (1977-78).
60 Under such an amendment, localities could possibly be relieved of all section
65302(c) responsibilities because any expenditures made pursuant to this law - even
planning costs - could be construed as indirectly subsidizing low income housing.
61. Telephone interview with Rene Franken, consultant to the Assembly Com-
mittee on Housing (Sept. 7, 1977).
62. The bill would drastically modify existing legislative intent. Currently, the
guidelines offer the only test of what constitutes a sufficient housing element. With-
out the guidelines, a plaintiff's burden of proof is overwhelming. Private actions seek-
ing to enforce section 65302(c) probably will not surface. Cities could continue to
refuse to absorb their fair share of lower income housing demand and, instead, foist
the burden on neighboring communities.
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to the extent feasible."63 "Feasible" is defined as capable of being
accomplished within a reasonable period of time, taking into account
economic, environmental, social, and technological factors. A.B. 1727
seeks to create ambiguities about local lower income housing respon-
sibilities. Rather than specifying in greater detail what "adequate
provision" for community housing needs means, the measure intro-
duces a feasibility issue which localities can utilize as a defense for
failing to comply with the spirit of section 65302(c). Assembly Bill
1727 has proceeded farthest in the legislative process. The bill has
passed the assembly and only awaits review on the senate floor be-
fore it goes back to the assembly for concurrence in a minor amend-
ment.64 How Governor Brown will treat the bill, if it reaches his
desk, remains an open question. 5
Irrespective of the ultimate disposition of pending legislation,
the closeness of Assembly Bill 1727 to passage reveals that the Cali-
fornia legislature is waffling on the goal of providing decent hous-
ing for every Californian. This prospect is distressing. Legislative
retreat leaves a progressively worsening problem without a solution.
Delay in implementing an equitable housing policy can be expected
to produce further shortages because exclusionary land use regula-
tions will be allowed to continue forcing the cost of shelter up-
wards.60 An answer to the lower income housing question may need
to come from the judiciary. Although binding housing element guide-
lines and clear legislative intent are the most effective tools for al-
leviating housing injustices, relief may be also sought by pursuing
constitutional rights to adequate housing and residential access in the
courts. The California Supreme Court recently expressed its sensi-
tivity to the housing issue in its Livermore decision.0 7
The California Judiciary's Recognition of the
Housing Shortage
The Livermore Case: A Glimmer of Optimism
The California Supreme Court for the first time in Associated
63. A.B. 1727 (1977-78 legislative term, first session).
64. The amendment provides for the non-controversial removal of an urgency
clause.
65. The Irvine suit was scheduled for trial on December 13, 1977, but was settled in
October 1977. Plaintiffs decided to compromise and avoid the possible precedential
value of the action for two reasons. First, the trial court denied their third amended
complaint incorporating the theories of Livermore as a new cause of action and, second,
the legislature appeared to be rapidly retreating from its goal to house satisfactorily
every Californian. As part of the settlement agreement, the City of Irvine must over-
see and facilitate the construction of 1,700 lower income dwelling units.
66. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
67. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
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Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,68
considered the constitutionality of land use regulations adopted by
local governments that adversely affect persons residing outside a
particular city's boundaries. Livermore involved a challenge to an
initiative ordinance. The ordinance prohibits issuance of residential
building permits until local educational, sewage disposal, and water
supply facilities meet specified standards. 69 Plaintiff building con-
tractors sought to enjoin enforcement of this ordinance on the ground
it unreasonably promoted local interests at the expense of the greater
public welfare. Plaintiffs relied on two legal theories: first, that
the ordinance infringed on the constitutionally protected right to
travel and, second, that it violated substantive due process by ex-
ceeding the constitutional limits of the municipality's police power.70
The California Supreme Court found that Livermore's ordinance im-
posed only an indirect burden on the right to travel and held, on
the limited evidence before it, that the city had not exceeded its
police power. The court, however, concluded that in appropriate
circumstances unreasonable and exclusionary land use ordinances with
adverse impacts upon the greater public welfare as seen from a re-
gional perspective could be struck down by the courts as being in
excess of the local police power.71  Livermore by establishing a re-
gional perspective of the general welfare may provide the means for
meeting lower income housing responsibilities.
68. Id.
69. The Livermore initiative provides: A. The people of the City of Livermore
hereby find and declare that it is in the best interest of the City in order to protect
the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the city, to control building
permits in the said city. Residential buildings permits include single-family residen-
tial, multiple residential, and trailer court building permits within the meaning of the
City Code of Livermore and the General Plan of Livermore. Additionally, it is the
purpose of this initiative measure to contribute to the solution of air pollution in the
City of Livermore. B. The specific reasons for the proposed position are that the
undersigned believe that the resulting impact from issuing residential building permits
at the current rate results in the following problems mentioned below. Therefore,
no further residential permits are to be issued by the said city until satisfactory solu-
tions, as determined in the standards set forth, exist to all the following problems:
1. EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES - No double sessions in the schools nor over-
crowded classrooms as determined by the California Education Code.
2. SEWAGE - The sewage treatment facilities and capacities meet the standards
set by the Regional Water Quality Control Board.
3. WATER SUPPLY - No rationing of water with respect to human consump-
tion or irrigation and adequate water reserves for fire protection exist.
C. This ordinance may only be amended or repealed by the voters at a regular mu-
nicipal election. D. If any portion of this ordinance is declared invalid the remaining
portions are to be considered valid. Id. at 589 n.2, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 44.
70. Id. at 600, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (1976).
71. Id. at 607-08, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
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The "Regional Welfare" Standard
California's adoption of a regional perspective of the general wel-
fare follows a rapidly emerging national trend in the judicial review
of exclusionary zoning.r2  The test formulated in Livermore recog-
nizes that some local legislative land use regulations may be myopic
and that they may have extra territorial consequences. In Livermore
the supreme court utilized the traditional test of a zoning ordinance
under the state constitution and required the ordinance to bear a
rational relation to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community. 73  It added an important caveat, however: the local
legislature may no longer consider the effect of its ordinance within
municipal boundaries alone. Now it must also consider whether its
ordinance has a significant effect upon the larger region.74  By so
requiring, the Livermore decision marks a profound shift in the scope
of factual examination in which the judiciary will engage.
When a plaintiff challenges a municipal land use regulation as
violating due process by exceeding the scope of the city's police power,
the reviewing court is actively to consider the effect of the zoning
restriction. The Livermore court set out an innovative three part
test by which trial courts are to determine whether an ordinance
reasonably relates to the regional welfare.75 The first step involves
an analysis of the probable effect and duration of the local restriction.
The second step requires the trial court to identify and weigh the
competing local and regional interests affected by the local ordinance.
The third step is to determine whether the ordinance, in light of its
impact, represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing in-
terests. The Livermore majority opined that the trial court can in
some instances defer to the locality's finding of this accommodation
but that the accommodation must reflect a real and substantial, and
not fanciful, relationship between the ordinance and promotion of
the general welfare.76 Thus, while the court ostensibly adopted a
72. Note, A Regional Perspective of the "General Welfare," 14 SAN DIEo L. REv.
1227 (1977).
73. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) established the
validity of zoning regulation. See also Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,
234 P. 381 (1925) (establishing validity of zoning regulation in California).
74. The court stated: "[If, as alleged here, the ordinance may strongly influ-
ence the supply and distribution of housing for an entire metropolitan region, judicial
inquiry must consider the welfare of that region." 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607, 557 P.2d
473, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55 (1976).
75. Id. at 608-09, 557 P.2d at 88-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57.
76. "But judicial deference is not judicial abdication. The ordinance must have
a real and substantial relation to the public welfare. There must be a reasonable basis
in fact, not in fancy, to support the legislative determination." Id. at 609, 557 P.2d
at 489, 135 Cal. Rp.tr. at 57 (citation omitted).
lenient constitutional standard of review, it actually has burdened
trial courts with a searching role in their factual review of an exclu-
sionary ordinance's validityY7 The Livermore balancing test can be
seen as a mid-level constitutional standard of review because of the
increased scope of factual examination that it mandates. The test
directs reviewing courts to look beyond the stated motives of mu-
nicipalities and to consider carefully the actual effect of the local
legislation, while not shifting the burden of proof to municipalities.
A middle level of scrutiny must, however, be distinguished from
a strict scrutiny standard of review.-8 Strict scrutiny arises when an
equal protection analysis is invoked. In this area, the Supreme Court
has determined that state action which discriminates against certain
classes,7  or which touches upon fundamental rights, 80 violates equal
protection unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. 81 The
heavy burden of proving a compelling state interest rests with the
party defending the regulation. 8 2  A compelling state interest has
rarely been found.
8 3
The Livermore plaintiffs did not allege that the city's provisions
denied equal protection of the laws to landowners or migrants. As
the court noted, Livermore's prohibitions banned all construction,
both expensive and inexpensive.8 4  Thus, the court could distinguish
recent decisions in eastern courts dealing with exclusionary zoning,85
in which cities had allowed expensive single family residential con-
struction but had prohibited lower income housing. The discrimina-
tory action prompted the eastern courts to classify housing as a fun-
damental right per se, thereby making strict scrutiny of the local
legislation appropriate.
The keystone of the Livermore decision is the closer judicial
scrutiny that it recommends.8" Because of the heightened scope of
factual examination required, the California judiciary can no longer
defer to local legislatures without examining regional concerns. Low
77. 7 ENVIR. LAW REP. (BNA) 10066 (1977).
78. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 951-54 (1975).
79. E.g., classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin.
80. E.g., the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, and the right to freedom
of association.
81. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 331, 342 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
82. See San Antonio School Dist. No. 15 v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
83. See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
84. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 602, 557 P.2d 473, 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 52 (1976).
85. See text accompanying notes 88-100 infra.
86. See 7 ENVM. LAW REP. 10067 [1977].
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and moderate income housing needs have to be considered and an-
alyzed before local exclusionary ordinances can be upheld.
The Evolution of Livermore
A desirable evolution of Livermore should mean that the bound-
aries of presumptive constitutional validity accorded local zoning
ordinances will contract and that municipalities will face greater
burdens in defending restrictive ordinances. As a consequence, re-
formed lower income housing policy could result in at least one of
two ways. California courts could move from a balancing test to a
strict scrutiny approach, following the lead of the New Jersey and
Pennsylvania courts.8 7  In the alternative, California courts could con-
tinue to utilize the balancing test but in balancing recognize the ur-
gency of regional housing needs, so that in the immediate future the
need for housing would prevail over exclusionary attempts by munic-
ipalities.
Expanding Livermore by Adopting Strict Scrutiny
Livermore finds parallels in case law that has developed outside
California. New Jersey,8 8 Pennsylvania,8 9 and New York90 have
adopted the regional perspective of the general welfare and have
demonstrated a concern for regional housing demand. A community's
use of its police power to bar unwanted growth at the expense of
lower income households which are denied residential access and of
neighboring cities which are forced to shoulder more than their fair
share of certain regional housing needs has not been tolerated.91 In
implementing the regional perspective, with one exception, 92 the
eastern cases treated housing as a fundamental right and have adopted
a strict scrutiny standard of review.93 The New Jersey courts, faced
87. See notes 88-89 infra.
88. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
89. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); In re Girsch,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965).
90. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
91. See Note, A Regional Perspective of the "General Welfare," 14 SAN DIEGo L.
lEv. 1227 (1977).
92. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, offers a middle-
level scrutiny of the local definition of the general welfare. Exclusionary ordinances
coming before the New York courts are not presumptively invalid.
93. See notes 88-90 supra. Like California, the eastern states have founded their
decisions on state constitutional grounds, so as to preclude review by the United States
Supreme Court. This policy is motivated by the United States Supreme Court's forty-
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with a statewide pattern of exclusion, 94 have been the most rigorous
in the application of strict scrutiny. Exclusionary municipal land use
regulations come before the New Jersey courts with no presumption
of validity.95 When plaintiffs have presented a prima facie case, the
burden shifts and localities must justify their regulations. To be suc-
cessful, proponents of the regulation must prove that the exclusionary
regulation was promulgated and is maintained pursuant to a compel-
ling state interest. In New Jersey, local environmental and fiscal
concerns have not been held to constitute compelling state interests.9 6
This treatment of two such traditionally valid concerns indicates that
in New Jersey exclusionary regulations are unlikely to withstand ju-
dicial review.
97
New Jersey's highest court set forth its rationale in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.98 The
court stated that every community in designing its land use regula-
tions, must "make realistically possible an appropriate variety and
choice of housing" and that to the extent of the municipality's fair
share of regional lower income housing need, it cannot foreclose the
opportunity for lower income people to obtain satisfactory housing. 99
Recently, this sentiment was echoed by the New Jersey high court in
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison.100 The court
stated that "it is incumbent upon the [local] governing body to ad-
just its zoning regulations so as to render possible . . . 'least cost'
housing . . .in amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficit in the hy-
year abstention from the field and by the Court's recent rulings on land use matters
that have been quite inconsistent with recent developments in the state courts. See
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (a local
land use regulation limiting use to single family purposes did not violate equal pro-
tection although a pressing need for multifamily housing was shown), Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). But cf. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 558 F.2d 1283, cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3431 (Jan. 10, 1978) (holding that
village had a statutory obligation under the Fair Housing Act to refrain from zoning
practice that effectively foreclosed construction of any low cost housing).
94. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 519, 371
A.2d 1192, 1231 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting) (1977).
95. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 166, 169, 336 A.2d 713, 728, 731 (1975).
96. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel. Id.
at 169, 336 A.2d 713, 731: "While we fully recognize the increasingly heavy burden
of local taxes for municipal governmental and school costs on homeowners, relief from
the consequences of this tax system will have to be furnished by other branches of gov-
ernment. It cannot legitimately be accomplished by restricting types of housing through
the zoning process of developing communities."
97. See notes 81-82 supra.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 162, 336 A.2d at 724.
100. 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
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pothesized fair share."1 1 The court continued, "Nothing less than
zoning for least cost housing will . . . satisfy the mandates of Mt.
Laurel."0 2  New Jersey has thus affirmatively responded to its hous-
ing shortage crisis.
Pennsylvania' °3 has also dealt with exclusionary land use prac-
tices. The jurisdiction has not experienced the degree of exclusion
that New Jersey has encountered; therefore, it does not employ the
strict scrutiny test as ambitiously. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
nonetheless has announced that thinly-veiled justifications for exclu-
sionary zoning will not be tolerated.104  For example, in In re Girsch,
which concerned the validity of a prohibition against a multifamily
dwelling unit, the court held that zoning cannot be used as a means
for localities to shirk responsibilities that time and population growth
have imposed on them.10 5 When a locality can be shown to dis-
criminate against low and moderate income groups, a court's invo-
cation of a strict scrutiny test has advantages. The approach re-
moves the uncertainty of the balancing process, and lower income
housing needs do not have to be pitted continually against local con-
cerns, like environmental concerns. The adoption of a strict scrutiny
standard in California, however, has two distinct shortcomings.
First, the approach requires that housing be classified as a funda-
mental right in order to justify strict scrutiny of local legislation un-
der the doctrine of equal protection.10 6  Not all courts are willing to
classify housing as a fundamental interest per se. The United States
Supreme Court, most notably, has refused to do S0.107 Although
strict scrutiny is a product of the successful school desegregation liti-
gation which sharpened the notion of equal protection as a tool against
racial classification, there is a difference in treatment of denial of
housing on the basis of race and denial of housing on the basis of
economic status.10 8  Economic equal protection has not been equated
101. Id. at 516, 371 A.2d 1207. In 1973 President Nixon impounded funds for fed-
erally subsidizing housing. The nonavailability of federal funds impaired the Mount
Laurel decision because land zoned for low income housing remained vacant. Thus,
the court held that the local legislature could meet its Mount Laurel obligation by
zoning for the 'least cost housing" that private industry would build.
102. Id., 371 A.2d at 1208.
103. See note 89 supra.
104. In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. at 471, 268 A.2d at 770. The local
entity cited inadequate sewer facilities as the reason for the challenged zoning ordi-
nance.
105. In re Girsch, 437 Pa. at 240, 263 A.2d at 398 (1970).
106. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
107. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). United States v. Carolene Products,
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
108. See also ANDEnSON, AMmECAN LAW OF ZONING, § 8.15 (exclusionary zoning
as a denial of equal protection).
with racial equal protection. Even when the statistical correlation
between race and poverty have been shown to be high, discrimination
against the poor has not become discrimination against an ethnic
minority.109
A second disincentive to the adoption of the strict scrutiny stand-
ard is the doctrine's rigidity. Under the strict scrutiny test, all zoning
and land use ordinances shown to have an exclusionary effect would
be invalidated if a municipality was not absorbing its fair share of
regional low income housing need. Invalidation could occur despite
cogent local reasons for the ordinance. To insist that land use regu-
lations are invalid unless the interests supporting the exclusion are
compelling would endanger the municipal planning process. In
Livermore the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved such
a result whereby presumptions of validity become presumptions of
invalidity.110
Expanding Livermore by Utilizing the Balancing Test
The rigidity of the strict scrutiny standard and its need to label
housing a fundamental right diminish the doctrine's appeal and de-
crease the likelihood that the California Supreme Court will adopt
the strict scrutiny standard as an expansion of Livermore. As a con-
sequence, housing needs of low and moderate income groups will
better be served by employing California's existing balancing test and
demonstrating to the court that regional housing needs outweigh lo-
cal interests. In the immediate future, because of the pressing need
for lower income housing, regional housing concerns usually should
be seen as outweighing the local interests behind exclusionary zoning.
The invalidation of many local exclusionary land use regulations
therefore is probable. In this way, because the invalidation of ex-
clusionary land use regulations reduces the cost of residential ac-
cess,"' the balancing approach has the potential to open the suburbs
and to bring relief to lower income households.
California's Lower Income Housing Crisis
California's urgent need for lower income housing can be easily
demonstrated. The housing industry is unable to provide enough
housing at sufficiently low prices. As a result, increasingly fewer
people are able to pay for the housing of their choice." 2 They must
109. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir. 1974).
110. 18 Cal. 3d at 603, 557 P.2d at 485, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
111. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
112. CALIFORNIA STATE DEP'T OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV., CALIFORNIA
STATEWIDE HoUsIN PLAN, 1977, at 17 [hereinafter cited as HCD PLAN].
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live in housing that is too small or expensive, that is deteriorated, or
that is located on the urban fringe or in the urban ghetto. Exclu-
sionary land use devices contribute to this dearth of low income hous-
ing. Local timed growth plans, for example, have placed additional
pressures on the housing stock of existing neighborhoods, causing the
normal deterioration process to accelerate greatly."n
California's lower income housing crisis relates to two basic prob-
lems: an adequate supply of physically sound housing and over-
paying.'1 4  Overpaying is the necessity for low and moderate income
households to pay more than 25 percent of gross income for housing."15
Inadequate Supply
More than one million housing units will have to be built in
California in the next five years to accommodate new households and
to replace housing units lost through normal attrition of the housing
stock." 6 Additionally, at least one million units should be rehabili-
tated or replaced if all households are to have access to decent hous-
ing." 7 When this construction need is contrasted to recent construc-
tion levels of 230,000 housing units annually, the severity of Cali-
fornia's housing situation becomes apparent. Although the normal
functioning of the housing market may partially satisfy basic general
housing needs, the normal housing market is unlikely to meet re-
habilitation or replacement lower income housing needs. This re-
sult is a consequence of noneffective demand. Despite the demo-
graphic need for housing, dwellers of substandard housing cannot
translate this need into market demand." 8  They simply cannot af-
ford better accommodations. In the absence, therefore, of an in-
crease in the purchasing power of lower income households or judi-
cial invalidation of exclusionary land use regulations, no major reduc-
tion in the proportion of seriously substandard housing to total hous-
ing is likely to occur.
Overpaying
Currently, 23 percent of all of California's low and moderate in-
113. ASSOCITION OF BAY AREA Goy RNmrs - SAN FnANcisco BAY AREA, PHASE
I OF THE REcIONAL HoUsING ELEmENT, 1975 at 10-11.
114. HCD PLAN, supra note 112, App. C at 28.
115. The 25 percent-of-income test is the variable the California legislature employs
when it discusses its objective of satisfactorily housing every Californian. CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 41126(c) (West Supp. 1977).
116. HCD PLN, supra note 112, at 21.
117. Id.
118. B. J. Frieden, Housing in America: 1976, p. 27 (Dec. 1976) (unpublished
working paper No. 274, Inst. of Urb. & Regional Dev., University of California,
Berkeley).
come households, a total of 1,780,000 households, are overpaying for
shelter. The State Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment considers overpaying as the most widespread housing prob-
lem in California." 9  Yet, the condition will become worse. An ex-
trapolation of present trends reveals that by 1982, 28 to 30 percent
of California's households will be lower income households paying
more than 25 percent of their income for housing. 120  The significance
of overpaying as a major housing problem is emphasized by the fact
that the greatest amount of overpaying is prevalent among the lowest
income families. The households with less than $2,000 annual in-
come cannot pay as much as 25 percent of their income for housing
and have enough money for food and other necessities also. Yet,
these households almost universally pay more than 35 percent of their
incomes for housing, and the shelter obtained is usually inadequate.
121
Conclusion
California's lower income housing shortage is approaching critical
levels. Local exclusionary land use regulations that oppose regional
fair share housing obligations compound the problem. Eradication
of exclusionary land use practices will not be a panacea, but such
action will significantly increase suburban residential access for lower
income households by reducing the cost of housing.
The future of lower income housing policy in California is at a
crucial decisionmaking point before both the legislature and judiciary.
The legislature, in reaction to detailed administrative regulations imple-
menting Government Code section 65302(c), seems to be retreating
from the goal that all Californians be decently housed. The judiciary,
although only recently made aware of regional housing shortages,
must monitor the evolution of the new zoning standard it expounded
in Livermore: the rule that local zoning decisions must bear a reason-
able relationship to the regional general welfare. Expansion of the
Livermore principle favorable to housing interests can occur in at
least two ways. A strict scrutiny test of judicial review which several
eastern states employ to strike down exclusionary land use regula-
tions can be adopted. In the alternative, the existing balancing test
may be used but used so that because of the urgency of regional
housing needs housing concerns preponderate over local interests.
The balancing test appears to be the better approach because it is
less harsh; the test does not challenge the presumptive validity ac-
corded land use regulations.
119. HCD PLAN, supra note 112, App. C at 28.
120. Id., App. C at 23.
121. Id., App. C at 28.
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The public welfare can no longer tolerate municipal contumacy
to inclusionary lower income housing policy. In proceeding beyond
the current crossroads, the legislature and judiciary should be guided
by the consideration that "the overriding objective [of land use reg-
ulations] should be to minimize rather than exacerbate social and
economic disparities, to lower barriers rather than raise them, to em-
phasize heterogeneity rather than homogeneity, to increase choice
[for residential location] rather than limit it."
122
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